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POLITICAL CRIMES DEFINED

ONTINENTAL Europe is in the midst of revolutions. The
immediate antecedents are such as to suggest the probable accompaniment of more widespread and perhaps even more intense passions of various sort, than have ever before been brought
into being with a revolution. This in turn suggests the likelihood
that there will follow more political plots and counter-revolutions
than is usual in such cases. From such causes it is highly probable
that the juridical meaning of the statutory words "an offense of a
political character" will be a matter of frequent controversy, as successive crops of exiles claim the right of asylum in America. The
character of the present revolutions is such that, more than usual
the exiles will be from the more fortunate and educated class which
has become disprivileged by the democratizing process. From such
considerations and others, it now becomes unusually important for
us to do a little dispassionate thinking upon this subject before our
own passions become still more involved. If we fail to secure a
definition that really defines political offenses, then our own judiciary may b6 compelled to flounder in the meshes of its own lawless
passions, and make the judicial action dependent upon each judge's
whim, caprice, or partisan passions.
PRESENT JURIDICAL CHAOS.

In connection with the British enactment of 1870 concerning extradition, the Attorney General is reported to have said in Parliament that they had found it more difficult to define a political offense than to define the Ulster Convention, and that they had finally given up the attempt and had left the matter to the courts.
Unfortunately there is no conspicuous reason to believe that our
judges are endowed with any greater intelligence than the Attorney
General, the British Parliament, or the American Congress.
Judges whose desires and mental processes are functioning at
relatively immature evolution'ary levels will have a corresponding
vanity. "Judicial dignity" makes it very difficult for such judges
to admit frankly the lack of omniscience. Accordingly such judges
tend to make a virtue of their inefficiency by proclaiming the expediency of their ignorance and of the despotic power which they
can assume as the result of uncertain statutes. This attitude is
illustrated by Mr. Justice Denham, who said: "I do not think it is
necessary or desirable that we should attempt to put into language,
in the shape of an exhaustive definition, exactly the whole state of
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things, or every state of things which might bring a particular case
within the description of an offense of a political character."' Such
uncertainty in the law is very gratifying to an infantile lust for autocratic powers, -sometimes craved even by judges when they are
the statedominated by a Kais~rian temperament. Thus I discredit
of
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precise definition, and that it is undesirable that judges be restrained
by known and certain rules of la*.
Under the old Russia, the Tzar's laws frankly defined in a separate code with increased severity of penalty all those offenses that
were of a political character. Some persons are temperamentally
so constituted that they cannot look full in the face those facts
which tend to discredit our claim of superiority over the regime of
the Tzar. Such will tend to create legal fictions to support of delusion of national grandeur. In consequence we read that: "Under
our laws there can be no crime of a political character" short of an
overt act constituting treason. That is the fiction. The fact is that
while our criteria of crime do not now include such crass confessions of class distinctions as formerly, all the economic offences
which were punished as lesser treasons are here and now suppressed
by new methods under new description, new names and new pretenses, 2 which partially conceal the old purposes. Much could be
said to prove that many among us are quite as fearful of further
democratization as were the Tzar and the Kaiser.
Judge Morrow in the Ezeta case (supra) tells us that:. "What
constitutes an offense of a political character has not yet been determined by judicial authority." It is in the same decision that he
tells us, that in American law there can be no crime of a political
character. If it were (cite) not that the liberty of every worthwhile citizen may be involved, one might forget the reverence expected by the judiciary and take a hearty laugh at the unconscious
humour of a judge who tells us that he does not know the legal
criteria of political *offenses and yet in his confessed ignorance informs us that under American law no such offense can exist.
Moore s cites Rolin with approval to the following effect: "Various definitions have been given of what constitutes a political offense. Such definitions, however, are of little practical value since
re Coitioni (1891), 1 Q. 13. T49; Jn re Exata, 62 Fed. Rep. 972, 998.
2 For an eighteenth century British view see: Constitutional Free Speech Defined and
Jan Jean
Defended, p. 175. For similar laws under the late Tzar see: The case of
U. S.
Pouren, pp. zo-4. Then compare: Free Speech for Radicals, and: Final Report of
before
Commission on Industrial Relations, x9tS, especially p. iso. Also the Proceedings
that Commission.
sMoore on Extradition, Y. I. p. 3oS.
'It
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the question whether a particular act comes within that category, is
preeminently circumstantial." This view apparently is quite generally accepted by courts. So long as this is true there is little that
resembles a "law" to restrain the whim, caprice, or passions of sympathy and avcersion on the part of our judges. When we are content that the differential essence 'of criminality shall be determined
by circumstances wholly objective to the criminal, which circumstances are not previously defined nor even definable, then we are
quite unconsciously classifying ourselves as still groping in the
murky mists of the pre-scientific and despotic past, when every judge
was a law unto himself. In the matter of political offenses we are
unfortunately and admittedly floundering in just such a sea of uncertainty. Because I believe this condition quite unnecessary therefore this essay is being written.
THE OLD AND NEW CRIMINOLOGY.

According to the older unenlightened practice, all "criminals"
were classified according to the physical facts of their conduct. According to the newer criminology which is fast coming into being,
the physical facts of the "crime" are considered as merely some of
the indications of the quality of the psychologic imperative which
conditioned the characteristics of the "criminal" conduct. Those
who are not already familiar with these newer aspects of criminology-are urged to study, among other material, the fine work which
Dr. Bernard Glueck has beem. doing at the psychiatric clinic of
Sing Sing prison.
This newer viewpoint of psychology and its data enable us to
classify the accused persons quite irrespective of their "crime."
From this viewpoint we classify the offense and the offender not
so much by what was done as by the psychologic how and the psychologic why of his conduct. At its best we consider even the subconscious factors of causation which were co-ordinated with the
obvious stimulus to produce the conduct complained of.
It should be understood that this quest for the character and
psychophysical causation of the offender's psychologic imperative
signifies very much more than the conscious motive, as that is understood in the old conception of a "criminal intent." By this last
we have usually meant only something that we reasoned into the
4 Recent progress in determining the nature of crime and the character of criminals.
No. zi6 Reprints of reports and addresses of the National Conference of Social Work,
9x?.
Meeting at Pittsburgh. Also: The causes of delinquency. First report of subcommittee. Same publisher. See also: Papers by Dr. Glueck, published in Mental Hy01t¢.

POLITICAL CRIMES DEFINED

consciousness of the accused. In the best and most comprehensive
sense our judgment will now include also an understanding of a
long range (in time and space) of the physical and psychic experiences of the past, all of which were formative of the present character and contributory determinants for the special impulsive states
which produced the "criminal" act. Thus we may apply, in addition to neurologic intelligence, and psychotechnics, also a genetic
and evolutionary psychology, which present the latest subjects of
scientific research. These latter sciences are still in the making, and
so near to their beginning, that their achievements have not yet illumined the dark recesses of legislative halls or of judicial-intellects.
Instead of pressing this psychologic viewpoint to the utmost, as
applied to political offenses, I wish to remain within the boundaries
of a more commonplace intelligence. In this paper I will therefore, limit myself by the desire that the political offenders shall be
judged, not by the physical quality and physical circumstances of
their acts, but by the psychologic qualities and circumstances of the
accused's inner compulsion, only in so far as that was a conscious
part of his "criminal" ;Cct. From the highest level of understanding human conduct, we should include also his contributory subconscious impulses. However, for the present I limit myself to the
task of laying a predominant stress upon the conscious motives of
the offender, even though that may only be the intellectualization
of one aspect of an emotional conflict, which he himself does not
adequately understand any more than the average judge understands it.
PSYCHOLOGIC IMPULSE V. CRIMINAL INTENT.

At the outset I must make it plain that by niotive we do not now
mean the old legalistic and mdralistic preconceptions which are always so very logically and so easily imputed to any one accused
of "crime". On our part the finding of a "criminal intent" is usually the mere formulation of some habitual, blind or relatively immature impulse or immature intellectual habit. Only those -vho can
get away from the relatively blind feeling-classifications and from
our instinctive moralistic judgments, are enabled to go in quest of
psychologic data, objective to the judge and outside the immediate
physical facts of the crime, for the classification and definition of
political offenders. Under the old method for determining intent,
the judge (or jury) simply used logical processes for reading into
the mind of the accused a feeling predisposition (a prejudice) on
the part of his triers. If this procedure were ever entirely con-
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scious it would be expressed something like this: "I feel a great
aversion to this act or to its consequences. Therefore, I know it
to be very evil and feel strongly that this crime must not go unavenged. Suipicious circumstances in evidence point only to the
accused. Therefore, the necessity of experience requires that the
accused be found guilty. Therefore, also he must have intended
what I feel to be the necessary evil consequences of such an act.
I feel this logical necessity so strongly that the accused cannot be
permitted to successfully deny it, nor to claim any mixture of countervalent motive. Th4refore, the accused is conclusively proven to
have been actuated by a 'criminal intent,' and is guilty according to
any degree of criminality which is implied in the worst aspect of
this reprehensible 'criminal intent' so logically imputed to him".
Thus by processes which seem extremely logical we read into the
mind of fhe accused what is really only our own blind instinctive
feeling-predisposition, the prejudice of our own fear-psychology,
our own emotional conflicts, very often working below the surface
of consciousness. Where the criteria of political offenses are supposed to rest vaguely in the circumstances of the, accused's conduct,
there is absolutely no protection whatever against caprice or prejudice finding, a supremely logical justification for convicting almost
any accused person.
It is very different if our mental processes and our desire to understand the accused are both functioning on a higher evolutionary
level. To achieve such an understanding may-require some changes
in the rules of evidence. Then instead of reading our predispositions into the accused we attempt to get out of the accused some
understanding of the quality of his psychologic imperative. This
is to be discovered by observation and an inductive study of the
motive as a fact of psychology, especially in its relation to his concept of, or feeling for social well-being. Now we ignore the question as to whether or not the accused acted in harmony with our
conception of the social progress of the future, or of the best means
to promote it. As a fact to be understood through greater psychologic insight and more careful psychologic observation, we might
earnestly seek to discover how far the accused was actually prompted by a social impulse for bettering human conditions, or for helping any group of humans to a better social adjustment, or to the
further democratization of welfare. Now we strive earnestly to
give the accused person a most sympathetic understanding, not caring whether we approve either his objects or his means for their
attainment. We insist upon discovering as a fact, by dispassionate
observation, the objective factors of causation, and the genesis and
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nature of the subjective aspect of the actuating impulse. Our discoveries in this direction will be then eagerly applied to check ourpredispositions. For this purpose we are compelled to take into
account, not only the immediate effect of the accused conduct, but
also the remoter social effects that it was designed to promote.
Likewise we will now concede that his social group and its interests
may be sociologically just as important as that to which we belong
or to which he may be hostile. Progress always proceeds by the
re-valuation of conventional conceptions of social values.
Now we may inquire if the offeniding act, in the mind of the accused was designed for the sole end of benefiting or avenging himself, or was it his conscious purpose or even his subconscious urge
to indulge in the prohibited conduct as a means to some larger and
more social ends. His motive is still selfish, of course, but in his
feelings at least, the self then includes all of some group of reformers or supposed victims of existing conditions, to'lerated or established by the State. It is in this sense that we now study motive as
a psychologic fact, not as a logical imputation. I repeat once more
that this psychologic fact is very different from the logical projection or imputation to the accused, of our own emotional moralistic
preconceptions, or aversions, such as may be, in our minds or in
our subconscious feelings associated with his act. It is also different from a mere exaction of conformity to legalized formulae for
maintaining a static cohcept of social well-being or of conformity to
our own conscious or unconscious class sympathies or interests.
CRITERIA OV POI TICAL CRIME.
6
We have now formulated briefly this psychologic viewp int in
criminology, and have sought.to emphasize the difference between
the motive for a "criminal" act, considered as a psychologic fact to
be discovered by psychologic inquiry and observation, as contrasted
with the older concept of a "criminal intent" as something which can
be logically imputed to one accused. It is the existence of such a
social motive, to be established as a psychologic fact that I propose
to make the criteria of "political crime". We will next proceed to
illustrate this viewpoint by its application to some debatable aspects
of "political crime" when that is conditioned upon its physicO circumstances. Thus we will see how this psychologic viewpoint, ana
its insistance upon inquiry about a social impulse, solves all the
existing problems of uncertainty in the legal test of political of'fenders. From here on this discussion is written also from the viewpoint that ideas are nearer to being impotent than to omnipotence;
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that thoughts are not things. Abstractly most people will probably
affirm this. Concretely, and quite unconsciously our behaviour is
otherwise. The explanation is that reason is only a function or
tool of desire. Being wholly ignorant of the psycho-determining
function of the autonomic system 5 and being very much aware of
only its end product in conscious reasoning, we are compelled, by
that very ignorance, to believe that it was our reason which determined our act, when in tact our impulsive desires determined both
our reasoning and our conduct. I cannot now stop to justify this
proposition, but for some readers this information will increase
their understanding of what I mean when I say that a judge's ex
post facto reasons only justify his prior desires in relation to the
problem before him. These reasons never determine the predispositions, and seldom modify them.
HYPOTHETICAL CASE AND CHANGED CONDITIONS.

Let us assume that a Russian Royalist and a German Bolshevik
are each concerned in a conspiracy'designed to overthrow the present existing governments of their.'respective countries. No overt
act of physical violence has occurred, let us assume. But these
conspirators were hoping that their respective efforts will some day
accumulate an adequate force to reestablish the Tzar in Russia and
induct the supremacy of the Bolsheviks in Germany.
It is conceivable that two such widely divergent programmes
would produce very different emotions and very intense ones in
some of our judge . Heretofore, the exiles have been usually the
victims of governments which had developed to less political liberty than our own, and sympathy usually was on the side of t'
exile. With the collapse of many royal establishments possibly our
sympathies may become somewhat hostile to the oncoming groups
of royalist exiles. All persons are not qualified to look with equal
calm on German counter-revolutionists seeking to reestaolish Kaiser
Wilhelm. In some quarters there would be even more disturbing
emotions if confronted with a German Bolshevik who sought to produce proletarian uprising with the view to democratizing useful labor and of welfare in Germany, instead of -mere political forms. It
is these situations with their irritating novelty that emphasize the
importance of a clearer concept as to the criteria of political offences.
Behind the past wordy quarrel over mere political constitutions
SKempf: "Autonomic Function and Personality." For another point of view see:
Psychologic Study of Judi-ial Opinion; Calif. Law Review, v. 6, pp. 89-1t3; Jan. 1918.
See also: reprint of same. Matricide and Mariolatry, Medico-Legal Jour., v. 36, pp. 4-10.
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and legal forms there always were more substantial bones of contention. One of these was for more intellectual liberty and the
other for greater equality of economic welfare. Under the late Tzar,
an industrial strike was a form of lesser treason'and a pglitical offence both in name and in fact. This was formerly true also in
England. There, to go from town to town seeking generally "to
enhance the salaries of laborers, these are by construction of law a
levying of war, because the design is general."" Even some judges
can sympathize with opposition to that state of things and could
consider acts committed in pursuance of that opposition as a political offense, especially when the occurrence was European and before the great war. Doubtless some judges could also give very
sympathetic consideration to a royalist counter-revolution which
sought to reestablish the old Russian regime.
Probably most of us lawyers would find it difficult to give a sympathetic understanding to a German Bolshevik who conspired to
establish in Germany a government for the democratization of labor
and of welfare and which would penalize all exploitation of laborers. Most of us give enthusiastic support for the general achievement of our own kind of democratic political forms. However, our
feelings are not yet generally attuned to the calm acceptance of the
democratization of labor and welfare, even if peaceably accomplished by our own accustomed political methods. Is it intelligent
to assume that unaided, all of us can remain in philosophic calm,
when confronted with a live Bolshevik who sought' to use revolutionary methods to force the democratization of labor and welfare upon
the former German aristocrats and their sympathizers? And yet
according to legal theory the Bolshevik should receive.the same consideration as a political refugee that is given to a Russian Monarchist. To do justice and check our instinctive impulses so as to judge
all by the same legal standard, we again find ourselves in need of
some definition for determining what are "offenses of a political
character." This standard should be such as to be exact and uniform in its application to both Bolshevik revolutionist and Monarchist revolutionists, as well as the more conventional political reformers. The existence of a conscious motive honestly believed and actually acted upon, to the effect that their respective revolutionary attempts if successful would on the whole promote the social welfare
or supply a more intelligently conceived "justice" for some social
group or unit, supplies such a criteria of what we may mean by a
political offender.
'Whitelocke Bulstrode: Charges to the Grand Jury and other juries (1718).
See also: Statute of Laborers in Nelson & Cromwell-Eng. Liberties.

p. 18.
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CRIMZFS INCID4NTAI TO THE POLITICAL.

It may be objected that if we make social motive the criteria of
a political offense that then we are extending the right of asylum
beyond the direct and immediate acts of revolution to cover accidental and incidental "crimes" only remotely or secondarily related to
the accomplishment of a political revolution.
This is true but it is no novelty. Such an extension to the incidental offences has al-eady been made. Mr. Sherman, secretary of
State in a letter dated Dec. 17, 1897, addressed to Mr. Romero,
Mexican Minister, said: "It follows, moreover, from the very tenor
of most of the extradition treaties that when they exclude political
offenses, it isprecisely connected, complex, or relative-politicizl offenses which are meant, the non-extradition for absolute political
offefises being considered as implied."
President McKinley, in his Annual Message to the Congress, Dec.
5,1898, put it thus: "The Mexican contention was that the exception only related to purely political offenses, and that as Guerra's
acts were admixed with the common crimes of murder, arson, kidnapping and robbery, the option of non-delivery became void, a position which this government wa unable to admit, in view of the
received international doctrine and practice in the matter." s
In a leading case an American court has approved the same view
quoting from the French authority Calvo when he says: "The exemption even extends to acts connected with political crimes or offenses, and it is enough, as says Mr. Faustin Helie that a common
crime be connected with a political act, that it be the outcome of or
be in execution of such, to be covered by the privilege which protects the latter."'
However, so long as this incidental relation of a "common crime"
to a "political crime" is allowed to be determined by viewing only
the physical acts- of the parties we are always at sea for a standard
of judgment. Under such circumstances we all tend unconsciously
to read into -the situation our own emotional attitudes and no rule
of law exists to hinder the process, or to.help our conscious desire
to check our predispositions. The situation is helped somewhat if
we look for the existence of social motive in the person who is accused of a "common crime' and by the existence of such a social
motiV'e give to his adt the quality of "an offense of. a political charMoore's Digest of International Law, v. 4, P. 344.
1 Moore's Digest of International Law, v-.4, PP. 349"3S0.
See also: International
American Conference, v. a, p. 6r5.
'Calvo Droit Int. (3 me ed.,) p. 413, se.
1262. Approved in: In re Ezto--62 Fed.
Itep. 999. Here other authorities are also reviewed at length.
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acter". Now we have a very precise issue of fact to decide, and the
operation of prejudices will then be limited to some possible distorted weighing of the evidence. Then the conscious checking of our
predispositions is relatively easy because now our standard is at least
theoretically certain, and our range of inquiry more limited.
IS A MILITARY COMMISSION NECESSARY?

Now we come to the application of our viewpoint to some concrete issues that have been actually raised. During our Civil War
privateers pirated upon the high seas, in aid of the Confederacy. It
was claimed and held (if my memory serves me) that an act of
piracy could not be a political offense unless those responsible therefor had been authorized to do what they did by the constituted authorities of the Confederacy. Here we see an adjudication which in
effect says that there cannot be such a person as a political offender
unless an organized government has been established by the rebels
and that government has by writing authorized the act complained
of. Also, here there is no allowance for crimes committed incidental to a revolution, though actually in furtherance of it.
Such a decision is manifestly against the weight of authority.
Such a standard of judging political offenses could be satisfactory
only to a judge having a strong bias against those particular offenders before the court or all political offenders and who is therefore
eager to accept any kind of reasoning that seemed to justify his personal end. A different. method and rcsult would have obtained if
the law concerning political offenders had required the judge to
search after the impulsive quality of the motive instead of.the immediate objectives sought to be attained by the accused. Then the
existence of such a commission would be strong circumstantial evidence but not conclusive. Neither would the absence of such a
commission be conclusive. On the contrary, the judge would go
into all the facts of the man's activities to discover the psychologic
why and the remote beneficiaries for whom the act of piracy was
committed. The existence or non-existence of a social impulse behind the act would then be -decisive, not the physical facts of his
act or its attendant outward painful circumstances.
MUST "STATE OV WAR

'

EXIST?

Very much like the above decision in relation to Confederate privateering, are those cases which say that no immunity as for a political offender can b'e recognized "when a state of recognized war
or open revolt has 'not existed." According to this standard the
Boston Tea Party and John Brown's anti-slavery activities were just
ordinary "criminal acts". In short there is no "political offense"
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until a revolution has obtained such success and headway as to secure international recognition as a "state of recognized war." Of
course the general trend of judicial conduct is against such a conclusion. But such a narrow rule is -again made possible by the want
of legal criteria of political offenders, combined in the judge with
an aversion to that democratization which seldom comes otherwise
than by physical revolution. Such arbitrariness is impossible if
judges could be compelled to make inquiry for a social impulse as
the motive for the act, instead of determining the .qualities of political offenders from the physical facts of conduct.
THE TERRORISTS.

There are variants o± the above contention nearly as restrictive
as 'the last one. Thus it is claimed that "there must in such cases
be two parties in the State each striving to impose its own government upon the other." ' In a Russian case it was argued" that it
was indispensable that the refugee must have been a member of a
large and organized body of men; that this body must have haduniforms; that they must have attacked the military and stolen only
military supplies, etc., etc.
This contention was not upheld., Again we say that the acceptance of such an argument and distinction, only manifests the desirl
or willingness that the right of asylum' should be all but abolished.
As revolution can never come into being full-fledged,. every revolution has its beginning in the acts of a few individuals. Those who
initiate a revolution, or make a futile attempt to do so, or even single-handed hope to destroy what they consider despotism, by making
it unsafe for the tyrant; are just as much political offenders as those
who succeed. Only those who fail are apt to need the "right of
asylum". The compulsory inquiry for the discovery of a social mo-.
tive behind the act or even a solitary individual offender, will make
it more difficult for feudal minded judges to explain awiy any part
.of the right of asylum.
PUNISRMEN'f AS DETERRANT FOR "CRIME".

Mdst of our criminal codes are still based upon the theory of punishment, as revenge and as a deterrant. Judges"who have not outgrown the medieval attitude often justify severe penalties on "criminals" not because the particular act merits it, but on the theory that
the man before the court can and should be made to suffer dispro'In

re'Muier (1894); 2 Q. B. 4.-. 71 Law Times N. S. 403; IS Cox C. C.
On the Authority of: KenneStt v. Chambers, x4 Howard 34.

IS.
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portionately and vicariously as a deterrant in others. Of course,
such judges draw on their inner consciousness for arguments. A
reference to prison statistics as to recidivists, or an acquaintance
with the history of revolutionary activities in Germany and Russia
during the last half century*might disallusion such judges. Therefore, they avoid such history and such available information about
the actual influence of their sentences. They desire- sadistic impulses justified, not discredited or checked. While revolutionists
often vaunt themselves upon their intellectual superiority they are
in fact just as ignorant as our judges. So through like fallacious
reasoning the terrorists of Russia came into being. They attempted
to avenge upon the responsible officials every "legalized wrong" done
to a revolutionist, on account of his revolutionary activity. They
too, thought to deter "legalized crime" on the part of the authorities, by having revolutionists inflict the death penalty upon responsible official miscreants. They reasoned as do our judges, that
tyranny and crime can be minimized by making them unsafe, that is,
by terrorizing the potential tyrant and potential official "criminal".
But it never works that way. The savagery of the judges "justified" terrorism. Terrorism "justified" the savagery of the judges.
So we go round and round the circle. German junker theories of
Schrecklichkeit embodied the same theory in its application to war.
They too thought to deter opposition by terrorism. They too failed.
The present Russian chaos is the product of such conduct, "justified"
by.the same theories. How could Bolsheviks be expected to act different when all the rest of the world insists that terrorism is the
way to induce conformity? If similar chaos comes in Germany, as
seems quite possible at this writing, the same forces will operate and
the same theories will be invoked in justification. Always this conduct is very logically justified by such theories about the deterrant
influence. of Schrecklichkeit. German Schrecklichkeit and Russian
terrorism are of the same quality of ignorance as that manifested
by our criminal codes and especially by judges who finid "good reasons" for extravagantly punitive penalties and for denying the right
of asylum to any socially motived foreign offenders. Human nature was not constructed according to either German logic or judicial logic. To understand human nature we must forget logic and
make an objective study of the behaviour of human impulses.
TERRORISTS AND ANARCHISTS.

The genetic psychologist sees in all these special pleas to justify
vengeance, the operation of an emotional conflict. That such theories for vengeful cruelty find equally vigorous growth at both end"
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of the conventional social scale only evidences the likeness of the
impulses and emotional disturbances that are at work in both classes.
In the psychology of the conflict we find subjective element of unity
between love and hate, between Russian terrorist and American
feudal minded judge, between anarch and legalolatrist. A distinguished psychologist has said: "The most patent cause of revolution in the society of man is affectiye or autonomic repression, usually due to usurpation and waste of economic necessities and sex."12
Now let us see the occasional working out of this emotional aversion when we come to applying the protecting doctrine of political
refugees to terrorist-anarchists and other terrorists. There are of
course, many varieties of anarchists including the extreme non-resistant type of Tolstoy and of Paul Blaudin Mnasson.1 3
Norman Angel, George Ticknor Curtis and Judge Colley all concur that "dynamite criminals" should be surrendered "not as political
offenders but as assassins whom no civilized government will protect." That is almost the same language in which dissenters from
the established religion were once denounced. Those whob. fear
psychology is functioning near the morbid level always tend toward
this kind of absolutism. They therefore tend to intellectualize the
fear of a destruction of their own ideals, as akin to the dethronement
of God or the destruction of all human values. Again applying the
doctrine of the subjective unity of love and hate we come to the
conclusion that temperamentally (psychologically) the judicial terrorist and the outlawed political terrorist are functioning on the
same evolutionary level of desire and of ignorance of human nature.
Probably both are unconsciously working out the emotional conflict
(sado-masochism) and inventing the same ex-post facto and a priori
justification.
Those who are free from such conflicts do not get excited even
when an anarchist applies to despots our legalized theory of personal
"moral responsibility" for .disapproved conduct. The royalist who
recently shot Eisner of the German Cabinet, the socialists who recently shot Liebknecht and Luxemburg in Germany, the anarchist
or Terrorist who killed Count Stolypen 'should be tried by the. same
standard. This cannot be if the criteria of "political offenders" is
made to depend upon the kind of weapon used or the sort of organization with which its user would supplant existing institutions.
Only judicial lawlessness will result if we protect an assasiin who
Is Kempf, Autonomic Function and personality. 13. For the unity of love and bate
see: 14atricide and -Mariolatry. Medico-Legal Jour. 36-40.
" See Anarchism at *the Lord s Farm. The record of a social experiment written
by me, and soon to be published.
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seeks to avenge or reestablish the rule by divine right, and refuse
protection to the anarchists who erroneously think so well of humanity that they believe that it functions most efficiently when organized under voluntary co-operation.
The governmental autocrat believes that humanity can be efficiently organized only by imposing the superior wisdom of a propertied and privileged class. These autocrats accordingly use legalized.violence and often unlegalized violence to compel cooperation in
the maintenance of rule by divine right. Those who are trained in
political democracy believe that more intelligent economic justice
can be obtained through the abolition of hereditary political privileges and prerogatives and by the establishment of a compulsory
cooperation for the maintenance of political democracy. Often our
own police and sometimes our own courts, sanction unlegalized violence in the promotion of this end. The anarchist believes that political demoiracy has failed to democratize labor, education and
welfare. Therefore the anarchist seeks to abolish all existing political forms in order to secure the substance instead of the machinery of democracy which alone justifies in his mind the existence of
any rule, so these seek to accomplish their end by means of a wholly
voluntary cooperation. A few of the anarchists believe they can
promote the destruction of "obsolete" political forms by means of
violefice directed against the "tyrant" and they justify themselves
by the use of judicial logic founded upon psychologic ignorance.
Of course, humans have not yet reached perfect God-hood and
therefore perhaps the Anarchist scheme m.y be as much of a failure as was the rule by divine right. It has only the advantage of
not having been observed in actual general operation.
Our past tendency has been to say that an act of violence to promote government by divine right or political democracy is a political offense, but that an act of violence to promote the -democratization of labor education and welfare by the abolition of all political
institutions and in favor of a voluntary cooperation, cannot be a
political offense under any circumstances. According to some fearpsychology functioning in high places, the anarchist who would
destroy all coercive political government by the use of violence is
not engaged in political offense. So contradictory do our intellects
work under the influence of our emotional conflicts when unrestrained by any devotion to a general criteria of political offenses.
In the objective factors of the conduct of such persons we can always find "conclusive reasons" for our own passionate aversions.

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
NEW STANDARD

APPLIED.

All tlis has a different appearance when we approach our problem from the viewpoint of a search for a socialized impulsive motive. Now nothing is to be declared per se a political offense or not,
merely because we approve or disapprove the offenders particular
weapon of violence (dynamite), the quality or number of his associates, the intensity of their coherence, the character of their clothes
(uniforms) or their theories for improving economic justice or intellectual liberty. Now a man is not to be prejudged as having a
socialized political motive, nor of being incapable of a political offence merely because he is a divine-righter. Neither is he to be
prejudged as being per se, and necessarily either capable or incapable of a purely personal revenge void of social impulse, merely because he is an Anarchist or Bolshevist. Now we judge of the existence of a social impulse as an inducement to the violence complained
of wholly upon objective psychologic observation and evidence,
judging the man's life and motive as a whole and in proce- of evolution, and not by the. exclusive use of the physical factors and incidents of his conduct; nor yet-by the mere logical imputation of an
intent or an immediate objective aim, to aid which the physical fact
can be construed according to any predisposition that may prevail.
If ours is to be a government of laws and not of men then Tzarite-terrorist and Anarch-terrorist, Kiserite-revolutionist and Bolshevik-revolutionist, Irish nationalist and Indian revolutionist, Militant
suffragette and American pacifists and conscientious objector must
have all their "crimes" judged as to their political character by the
same legal standard. This is not done when the statute leaves a
judge free to indulge his personal whim in choosing such physical
factors of the "crime" as suit even his unconscious predisposition
to classify the "crime" as political or not. A large measure of "law"
is injected into the situation if the court is required to make inquiry
as to the existence of a. social impulse for the "crime" and required
to classify the offense accordingly. Have we become sufficiently removed from the love of judicial lawlessness to make this possiblenow-as applied to "political offenders ?"
THEODORE SCHROEDER-

New York.

